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Trub: Cumulative Voting and Classified Directorates

Cumulative Voting and Classified Directorates
The modem business corporation has reached its present position as an integral part of the American scene through a continuous
process of growth and expansion. The first American general incorporation law was enacted in New York in 1811' and with the
passage of time, the privilege of self-incorporation under general
laws became prevalent. As an increasing number of states created
the general right to incorporate, many corporations were formed
and brought with their formation numerous complexities in carrying
out corporate business. The board of directors became the vehicle
of management in which was vested the supreme and original authority in directing matters of ordinary business.
A corporate body can act only by agents2 and the board of
directors of a corporation, being duly constituted by the law as
the agency for the doing of corporate acts, has the power to do
all things proper to be done by the corporation when not inhibited
by statute, charter, or by-law.' It is universally recognized that the
directors ascend to their positions of authority only by virtue of stockholder elections held expressly for that purpose.4
In wrestling with the problem of electing these directors, several
methods have been devised, each attempting to alleviate inequities
in election procedure which may have developed as the years
progressed.
The two major methods of electing directors are by "straight
voting" and by "cumulative voting."5 Though we are not here
concerned with the "straight voting" method, a comparison of these
two basic methods will enlighten and explain the ultimate result
achieved by use of either or both of them. Under straight voting,
the more common method, a stockholder group with a majority
of votes at the annual election can elect its full slate of directors.'
In comparison, cumulative voting is a method wherein each voting
shareholder is entitled to votes equal to the number of his shares
1 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS

37 (rev. ed. 1946).

2 Manson v. Curtis,
3 Berkeley County

223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918).
Court v. Martinsburg & Potomac Turnpike Co., 92
W. Va. 426, 115 S.E. 448 (1922).
4 BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 391.
5
6 WILLIAMS, CUMULATIVE VOTING FOR DImCToRs 6 (1951).
ibid. If the straight voting method is used, in a contest for the election
of a board of nine directors, a group holding 51% of 10,000 shares voting,
each share being entitled to one vote, could cast 5,100 votes for each of its
nine candidates. An opposition group of stockholders with 4,900 votes could
muster only 4,900 for each of its candidates, and could elect no one.
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multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. Once this
number of votes is determined, the holder may cast all these votes
for a single director or distribute them among two or more candidates as he sees fit.' When cumulative voting is provided for,' it
brings to the corporate system a means by which a significant group
of stockholders, though in the minority, can elect candidates of its
choice to the board of directors.
It was John Stuart Mill,' who, in 1861, recognized that an
essential part of democracy requires that minorities be adequately
represented. It was not his theory that the minority should prevail,
but that a governmental body would be a better one for having
heard the views of the minority. This principle of "personal representation" or "equal representation of minorities" did not originate
with him, but it was he who caused the political thinkers in the
United States to consider the principle of minority representation."0
Legislators also subsequently recognized the need for affording
the minority an opportunity for representation. Prior to the mandates of the constitutional convention which met in Illinois in 1869,
no state of the United States had enacted or adopted any laws providing for cumulative voting." By adopting the Illinois Constitution of 1870, the state of Illinois provided cumulative voting not
only for the election of members of the House of Representatives
of its General Assembly, but also for the election of directors by
shareholders of private business corporations. 2
Thirteen states,' 3 including Illinois, now have constitutional
provisions on cumulative voting for directors of private corporations.
Cumulative voting is mandatory under each of these provisions.
7
lbid. With cumulative voting, if nine directors are to be elected and
with 10,000 shares voting, a group with 5,100 shares would be entitled to a
total of 45,900 votes and the group with 4,900 shares to 44,100 votes. By
distributing its 44,100 votes among only four candidates, the minority stockholders 'group could give each of the four members 11,025 votes. No matter
how the majority distributes its votes, it can elect no more than five directors,
since8 it cannot give its sixth man as many as 11,025 votes.
Unless expressly provided for, there is no common law right to cumulate
votes.9 Proctor Coal Co. v. Finley, 98 Ky. 405, 33 S.W. 188 (1895).
MILL, REPRESENTATVE GOVERNMENT (1861).
0oCampbell, The Origin and Growth of Cumulative Voting for Directors,
10 Bus. LAw 3 (1955).
11Id. at 4.
12 ILL. CONsT. art. XI, § 3.
'3 Campbell, supra note 10, at 7. Arizona, Idaho, Kentucky, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, and West Virginia.
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Seven states' 4 have mandatory cumulative voting for directors
by reason of statutory law alone. There are now seventeen states,'"
plus the District of Columbia, which have express statutory provisions making cumulative voting for directors permissive. The remaining states,' 6 eleven in number, have no express provision either
in their constitutions or their statutes on the subject of cumulative
voting for directors.
Cumulative voting, while designed to provide minority representation, is not designed to guarantee minority representation.
Whether the minority will be able to achieve representation at
any meeting of shareholders depends upon two factors:' 7 (1) the
number of directors to be elected, and (2) the total number of
shares represented at the meeting, rather than the total number
of shares entitled to vote.
The arguments for the principle of providing for minority
representation are set forth as follows:'" (1) a board of directors,
regardless of its size, should represent as many shareholders as possible; (2) cumulative voting is the only means by which the minority
may conceivably gain some representation on the board of directors;
(3) although the majority will continue to control under cumulative
voting, better management will result if the entire board hears the
views and opinions of the minority on all matters considered by
it; and (4) the presence of at least one minority representative on
the board of directors will serve to restrain the tendency of those
who comprise the majority to operate the corporation for their own
benefit.
Those opposing the principle of cumulative voting present the
following arguments: 9 (1) to operate effectively, the board of directors must be comprised of members chosen only by the majority,
for otherwise, there will be no teamwork on the board; (2) minority
representation on a board often results in an unwieldy and ineffective
14 Campbell, supra note 10 at 8. Arkansas, California, Kansas, Michigan,
Ohio, Washington, and Wyoming.
1- Campbell, supra note 10, at 9. Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, Louisiana,
Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia.
6
1 Campbell, supra note 10, at 10. Alabama, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Texas, Utah, and

Wisconsin.
'7 Campbell, supra note 10, at 11.
'8 Campbell, supra note 10, at 15.
19 Campbell, supra note 11, at 15.
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coalition of directors; and (3) cumulative voting affords the means
by which a shareholder can readily harrass the management.
Despite what may appear to be valid arguments against it, cumulative voting has been overwhelmingly adopted throughout the
United States. As can readily be seen, cumulative voting does
afford the minority an opportunity to gain representation on a board
of directors which they obviously would not have without it.
Those comprising the majority have naturally sought some
method by which to curb the ambitions of the minority groups of
shareholders. An effective device to limit the use of cumulative
voting is classification of directors. 0 Classified or "staggered" boards
are usually established through enactment of a by-law normally dividing the directors into three classes. Generally, under the classified
provision,' the first class of directors are elected for three-year
terms, those of the second class for two-year terms, and those of
the third class for a one-year term. Thereafter each class is elected
for full three-year terms, so that the directors of only one class come
up for election each year.
By reducing the number of candidates to be elected each year,
classification effectively limits the ability of minority groups to gain
any advantage by voting cumulatively. Though it does not eliminate
the right to vote in this manner, it dilutes the effect that it may
have for all but the very strong minority groups.22
Classification of directors is expressly authorized by statute in
thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia.2 3 In four other
states,2" classification is permitted by clear implication from the
language of the statutes. Four additional states have no statutory
provision, which, if followed, would be inconsistent with classified
directorates. Only Alabama and California seem to prohibit classification. 5 Statutes expressly permitting classification of directors
20

WIMIAMS

op. cit. supra note 5, at 48.

Ibid. To elect one director to a nine-man board which was not
classified, the majority would need only one more than 10% of the votes
at the meeting. By reducing the number of directors to be voted on to just
three, classification has raised the number of votes needed to elect a minority
candidate from 10% plus one to 25% plus one.
22 WILLIUMS, op. cit. supra note 5, at 49.
23
Adkins, Corporate Democracy and Classified Directorates, 11 Bus.
22

LAw 2431 (1955).

Ibid.

25 Ibid.
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are of ancient vintage, 26 indicating that classification has long been
permissible.
Just as pros and cons have been presented and debated over
cumulative voting, many arguments both for and against classified
directorates may be presented. Foremost among those in favor of
classification is that it will assure a director that he will be a member
of the board for longer than one year. This in turn will permit him
to become more familiar with the affairs of the corporation and
gain a sense of continuity of policy which he could not have acquired
if he had just been elected for a single year.21 Certainly the advantages gained by continuity of management are important. Recognizing that classification makes it much harder for persons seeking
to obtain control of management to do so, an important question
in deciding whether classification should be retained is whether the
process of ousting management from control should be made easier
or harder for a group of "insurgents." When considering this, it
should be remembered that many attempts to unseat management
are not brought to benefit the corporation, but merely to benefit
those attempting to gain control. Classification, to an extent, is an
effective means of discouraging these attempts.
An analysis of the major cases concerned with the coexistence
of cumulative voting and classified directorates will explain the intricacies of the problem involved. In the celebrated case of Wolfson
v. Avery,"8 the board of directors of Montgomery Ward & Company
was composed of nine members divided into three classes of three
directors each. At each annual meeting of the stockholders one
class was elected for a term of three years. An action was brought to
have that section of the Illinois Business Corporation Act29 pur26

1Id. at 32. The Maryland statute was enacted in 1868; the Illinois
statute
27 in 1871, and the Pennsylvania statute in 1887.

Ibid.

28
6 Ill. 2d 678, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955).
29
ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.35 (1959), provides as follows: "When
the board of directors shall consist of nine or more members, in lieu of
electing the whole number of directors annually, the by-laws may provide
that the directors be divided into either two or three classes, each class to be
as nearly equal in number as possible, the term of office of directors of the
first class to expire at the first annual meeting of shareholders after their
election, and that of the third class, if any, to expire at the third annual
meeting after their election. At each annual meeting after such classification
the number of directors equal to the number of the class whose term expires
at the time of such meeting shall be elected to hold office until the second
succeeding annual meeting, if there be two classes, or until the third succeeding annual meeting, if there be three classes.
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porting to authorize the classification of corporate directors and the
election of only one class annually, declared violative of the rights
granted by the Illinois Constitution" and therefore unconstitutional.
The position of the Wolfson group, advocating the unconstitutionality of the Illinois statute, was that the purpose of cumulative
voting is to give minority shareholders the right to proportional
representation on corporate boards, and that representation in proportion to the holdings of the minority group is defeated if the entire
board is not elected at one time.31 The Avery group, in control
of management at the time this action was instituted, contended
that the purpose of cumulative voting is not to guarantee proportional representation but simply to enable minority groups to conceivably secure some representation on corporate boards of directors. 2 In construing Article XI, § 3, the Supreme Court of Illinois
found no implication from the words "to be elected," appearing in
the first clause, that less than the entire board may be elected at
one time. The court held that the second clause dealing expressly
with cumulative voting, indicates that all directors must be elected
at each regular election. That part of the constitutional provision
confers on each shareholder the right "to cumulate said shares, and
give one candidate as many votes as the number of directors multiplied by the number of his shares of stock shall equal, or to distribute them on the same principle among as many candidates as
he shall think fit."3 The court held that the words "candidate,"
"candidates," and the phrase "number of directors" should be given
their ordinary meaning, namely, the whole number of directors of
the corporation. The bases for declaring the statute unconstitutional
is that cumulative voting is authorized on the basis of the "number
of directors" rather than "the number of directors to be elected,"
and that cumulative voting is to provide for proportional representation, rather than just some representation for the minority.
0
"I
LL. CONST. art. XI, § 3, reads as follows: '"he general assembly
shall provide, by law, that in all elections for directors or managers of incorporated companies, every stockholder shall have the right to vote, in
person or by proxy, for the number of shares of stock owned by him, for
as many persons as there are directors to be elected, or to cumulate said
shares, and give one candidate as many votes as the number of directors
multiplied by the number of his shares of stock shall equal, or to distribute
them on the same principle among as many candidates as he shall think fit;
and such directors or managers shall not be elected in any other manner."
31 Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill.
2d 678, 126 N.E.2d 701, 705 (1955).
32 Ibid.
3' ILL. CONsT. art. XI, § 3.
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In a well-reasoned dissent,34 Mr. Justice Hershey pointed out
that the words "candidate" and "candidates" in the second clause
mean an aspirant for an office, and that the office to which the
candidate is aspiring is that of a director. From this, he reasons,
it is clear that cumulative voting exists only for voting upon those
directors on the board who are to be elected. Another valid argument is predicated upon the fact that if the number of votes is to
be computed, as decided in the majority opinion, this would only
increase the number of votes allotted to each side in proportion
to their stockholdings and would not alter the ultimate number of
directors which either group could elect to the board of directors.
In Humphrys v. The Winous Co.,3" the Ohio Court of Appeals
for Cuyahoga County held that a board consisting of only three
directors could not be classified into three classes where a statute
expressly permitted such classification and another statute provided
for cumulative voting. The court pointed out that the right of a
shareholder in an Ohio corporation to cumulate his vote had been
provided in the state of Ohio for more than fifty years. It further
stated that the legislature could not have intended that the passage
of a subsequent statute authorizing classification of directors could
be so used as to nullify the right of cumulative voting. 6 It is interesting to note that this case was not concerned with a constitutional provision and a subsequent statutory enactment, but dealt
with two statutes instead."
Classification of a three-man board into three classes would
definitely remove whatever opportunity a minority group had to
gain any representation on the board. A resolution to elect seven
directors, one at a time at the same meeting, was declared invalid
under the constitutional requirement of cumulative voting in Wright
v. Central Calif. Water Co. 8 This tactic, also employed by the
majority shareholders in the Humphrys case,39 eliminated any possibility of minority representation. If but one director is to be elected
at a time, there can be no cumulation of votes, either by the majority
or the minority.
34

Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill. 2d 678, 126 N.E.2d 701, 712 (1955).
125 N.E.2d 204 (Ohio 1954); aff'd, 164 Ohio St. 254, 129 N.E.2d
822 (1955).
36
37 d. at 210.
Adkins, supra note 23, at 36.
3867
Cal. 532, 8 Pac. 70 (1885).
39
Humphrys v. The Winous Co., 125 N.E.2d 204 (Ohio 1954).; affd,
164 Ohio St. 254, 129 N.E.2d 822 (1955).
35
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The Pennsylvania Constitution 0 provides for cumulative voting
and the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Act4 ' further clarifies
and interprets the constitution. Two Pennsylvania decisions, Janney
v. PhiladelphiaTrans. Co., 2 and Cohen v. A. M. Byers Co.,4" appear
to relate cumulative voting to the number of directors to be elected,
and in both, no conflict was found between classification of directors
and the provision for cumulative voting. In the Janney case, the
smallest class was composed of four directors and in the Cohen
case the smallest class was composed of three directors. Hence,
though proportional representation was not afforded the minority
groups in either of these corporations, at least some representation
was afforded them.
In the New York case of Bond v. Atlantic Terra Cotta Co.,"
the appellate division of the supreme court clearly indicated that
cumulative voting and classification were not incompatible partners.
In a recent Arizona decision, Bohannan v. The Corporation
Comm'n," the Supreme Court of Arizona held that provisions of
corporation articles authorizing a nine-man board, classified into
three classes, did not impair the rights of minority shareholders
guaranteed by constitutional and statutory provisions allowing cumulative voting. Although the provision of the Arizona Constitution"
also uses the words "to be elected," as does the Illinois constitu4
PA. CONsT. art. XVI, § 4, reads as follows: "In all elections for
directors or managers of a corporation each member or shareholder may
cast the whole number of his votes for one candidate, or distribute them upon
two or more candidates, as he may prefer."
41 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 2852-505 (1954), provides:

"...

In each elec-

tion for directors, every shareholder entitled to vote shall have the right,
in person or by proxy, to multiply the number of votes to which he may be
entitled by the number of directors to be elected, in the same election by
the holders of the class or classes of shares of which his shares are a part,
and he may cast the whole number of such votes for one candidate or he
may distribute them among any two or more candidates. The candidates
receiving the highest number of votes from each class or group of classes
entitled to elect directors separately up to the number of directors to be
elected in the same election by such class or group of classes shall be elected."
42 387 Pa. 282, 128 A.2d 76 (1956).
4 C.P. Allegheny County, Pa. (1950).
44 122 N.Y.S. 425 (1910).
45 82 Ariz. 299, 313 P.2d 379 (1957).
46 Amiz. CoNsT. art. XIV, § 10, provides: "In all elections for directors
or managers of any corporation, each shareholder shall have the right to
cast as many votes in the aggregate as he shall be entitled to vote in same
company under its charter multiplied by the number of directors or managers
to be elected at such election; and each shareholder may cast the whole
number of votes, either in person or by proxy, for one candidate, or distribute
such votes among two or more such candidates; and such directors or managers shall not be elected otherwise."
ARIz. REv. STAT. § 10-271 (1956), is merely a restatement of this article
and has no further bearing on the problem.
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tional provision47 on the same matter, the Arizona Supreme Court
was unable to conclude, as did the Illinois Supreme Court, that it
was the intention of the framers of the Arizona Constitution to
require that minority shareholders be represented on corporate boards
in proportion to the percentage of shares owned or controlled by
them. The purpose behind the constitutional provision, the court
held, was to make it possible that the minority will have "a member
on the board so that he knows what is going on."48
The Model Business Corporation Act,49 prepared by the Commission on Uniform State Laws, provides both for cumulative voting
and for permissive classification of directors and election for staggered
terms. Thus the Commission apparently has found merit in the
reasoning of the Arizona and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts and has
apparently rejected the contention of the Illinois Supreme Court
that the purpose of cumulative voting is to provide proportional
representation for the minority shareholders.
The basic problem which confronted the Illinois, Pennsylvania,
and Arizona Supreme Courts has been considered in a recent West
Virginia Supreme Court decision."0 The West Virginia Constitution
provided for cumulative voting as early as 1872.' The constitutional provision, 2 amended in 1958, has remained the same insofar as the provision for cumulative voting is concerned. This
47

ILL. CONST. art. XI,

48

Bohannan v. The Corporation Comm'n, 82 Ariz. 299, 313 P.2d 379,

§ 3.

382 (1957).
49 9 U.L.A. §§ 26-rn, 28-IV, pp. 173, 175 (1957).
50 State ex rel. Syphers v. McCune, 143 W. Va. 315, 101 S.E.2d 834 (1958).
51
Campbell, supra note 10, at 7.
52
W. VA. CONsT. art. X, § 4, prior to its amendment, read as follows:
"The Legislature shall provide by law that in all elections for directors or
managers of incorporated companies, every stockholder shall have the right
to vote, in person or by proxy, for the number of shares of stock owned by
him, for as many persons as there are directors or managers to be elected,
or to cumulate said shares, and give one candidate as many votes as the
number of directors multiplied by the number of his shares of stock, shall
equal, or to distribute them on the same principle among as many candidates
as he shall think fit; and such directors or managers shall not be elected in

any other manner."

W. VA. CONsT. art. XI, § 4, as amended, provides: 'qhe Legislature shall
provide by law that every corporation, other than a banking institution, shall
have power to issue one or more classes and series within classes of stock,
with or without par value, with full, limited or no voting powers, and with
preferences and special rights and qualifications, and that in all elections
for directors or managers of incorporated companies, every stockholder holding stock having the right to vote for directors, shall have the right to vote,
in person or by proxy, for the number of shares of stock owned by him,
for as many persons as there are directors or managers to be elected, or to
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constitutional provision and subsequent legislative enactments 3
based upon it were upheld by the court in Cross v. West Virginia
Cent. & Pa. Ry.,5 4 and were further commented upon in Germer v.
Triple-State Natural Gas & Oil Co.55 The provision of the constitution precisely allows the cumulation of shares, the number of
votes to be determined by multiplying the number of directors by
the number of shares of stock owned. The statutory provision, 6
subsequently enacted to interpret the constitutional mandate, provides that each shareholder, in all elections of directors of a corporation, "may cumulate such votes and give one candidate as many
votes as the number of directors 'to be elected' multiplied by the
number of his shares of stock shall equal .

. . ."

This modification

found in the language of the statutory provision allows it to be
construed in a manner different from that construction which may
be applied to the constitutional provision.
A clause of another legislative enactment once conferred and
perhaps still does confer the power on a corporation, by an amendment to its charter or by a proper meeting of stockholders called
to consider the matter, to divide its board of directors into one,
two, or three classes, the term of each class of directors not to
extend beyond three years.57

cumulate said shares and give one candidate as many votes as the number of
directors multiplied by the number of his shares of stock, shall equal, or to
distribute them on the same principle among as many candidates as he shall
think fit; and such directors or managers shall not be elected in any other
manner."
5
W. VA. CODE ch. 31, art. 1, § 66 (Michie 1961).
5435 W. Va. 174, 12 S.E. 1071 (1891).
" 60 W. Va. 143, 54 S.E. 509 (1906). Judge Poffenbarger, at p. 190,
states: ". . . by which a statute authorizes a minority stockholder to cumulate
his shares in voting for the election of officers, was held to be applicable
to a corporation organized before the passage of that statute. It was a
mandatory statute. It granted to the minority stockholder a privilege which
he was authorized to exercise. As to him it was permissive. He was not
bound to claim it, but he was given the right to do so. As to the majority
stockholders it was mandatory. It compelled them to submit to the exercise
of the privilege allowed the minority stockholder. It was not a permission
extended to the corporation .... It did not deprive them (the majority) of
the control of the corporation. They could still elect a majority of the
directors. All that it did do was to give the minority stockholder a chance
for representation on the board of directors, so that he could have a voice
in the management of the business in which he was interested . . . it (the
statute) said to the majority, 'you must allow the minority stockholder to
vote in your meetings in a certain way if he desires to do so."'
56W.VA. CODE ch. 31, art. 1, § 22 (Michie 1961).
57
W. VA. CODE ch. 31, art. 1, § 66 (Michie 1961).
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In State ex rel Syphers v. McCune, 8 petitioners were the holders
of shares of stock of a West Virginia corporation whose by-laws
provided for a board of five directors, the board being divided
into three classes. Two directors were to be elected in one year,
two in two years thereafter and one in four years thereafter, each
to serve for six years. Petitioners, at the stockholders annual meeting, were only permitted to vote the common stock which they
owned or for which they held proxies, and to cast their votes only
by voting one vote for each share for each of two candidates or
to cumulate the shares which they owned or for which they had
proxies by casting two votes for each share for one candidate. As
a result, petitioners could not elect a single director. Had five
directors been elected and had petitioners cumulated their votes and
cast five votes for each of the shares for which they owned or
held proxies, they could have gained representation on the board
in proportion to the percentage of shares which they owned or had
proxies to vote.
The court, in declaring classification invalid in the instant case,
made no direct reference to any other cases on the subject, nor
did it expressly invalidate our statutory provision for classification
of directors. Two of the five directors of the corporation were given
long-term contracts as directors which were also invalidated by the
court. However, it is not clear from the court's opinion, whether
the court took this into consideration when invalidating the by-law
classifying directors. The court, in its opinion, stated that during
the period provided by the two long-term contracts, there could
only be three other directorate positions to be filled, yet it subsequently declared these contracts invalid and held that these other two
directors would also have to be elected to the position of director
if they were to serve as such. If so, then in some years there
would be at least two directors elected, rather than just one, as
would be the case if the long-term contracts were upheld. Did
the court merely mean that if only one director was to be elected
each year, classification would vitiate the rights of the minority to
vote cumulatively? If so, then it has held in accord with prior
California and Ohio decisions.59 However, once again, this cannot
be ascertained from the opinion. In its decision, the court further
stated at p. 323, 101 S.E.2d at 838:
58 143 W. Va. 315, 101 S.E.2d 834 (1958).
59 67 Cal. 532, 8 Pac. 70 (1885); Humphrys v. The Winous Co., 125
N.E.2d 204 (Ohio 1954).
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"Regardless of the motives or purposes of the management of the corporation or whether such by-law provisions have proved beneficial, it is readily observable that
such limitation gives a majority of the stockholders the
power to elect all directors of the corporation with no
power in a lesser percentage of the votes to elect a single
director, and thus deprives entirely the minority of representation on the board and a voice in the management
of the affairs of the company. As stockholders have the
right to vote cumulatively, a plan which prevents the full
enjoyment of that right is to that extent, an effectual and
substantial denial of the right and illegal. Accordingly, we
are of the opinion that the stockholders had the right to
vote on all five positions of directors of the corporation
and they could not be limited to the selection of any lesser
number."
It is recognized that there are instances where cumulative voting
will not even conceivably afford the minority group "some" representation on the board of directors. The first of these is where
only one director is to be elected at a time. Another is where the
minority is so small in number that it cannot muster enough voting
strength, even if voting cumulatively, to gain membership. Here it
becomes a mathematical impossibility to gain representation, not
because the minority group is not afforded the opportunity to vote
cumulatively, but because they are weak in voting strength. With
these principles in mind, when speaking of gaining "some" representation, it must henceforth be assumed that the minority group is of
sufficient size in number to be able to gain at least "some" representation if permitted to vote cumulatively.
It is not clear from the above-quoted portion of the opinion
whether the court means that classification of directors to be invalid,
must give the power to the majority to elect "all directors" and
thereby "entirely deprive" the minority of any representation on
the board, or whether classification would be valid if it does not
"entirely deprive" the minority of "some" representation. The question thus becomes one of proportional representation for the minority
or just "some" representation for the minority. Perhaps all the
court means is that if some representation is afforded the minority,
then classified directorates can coexist with cumulative voting. Hence,
a nine-man board divided into three classes of three members per
class would allow "some" representation to the minority and would
be valid. The court goes a step further and speaks of a plan which
prevents the "full enjoyment" of the right of cumulative voting.
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Does the court indicate that "full enjoyment" can only be had by
the minority when the opportunity to gain proportional representation is afforded them? It seems that a stockholder can "fully enjoy"
his right to vote cumulatively when he has an opportunity to gain
"some" representation on the board of directors and that to "fully
enjoy" this right it is not necessary that the minority be afforded
an opportunity for representation in proportion to their stockholdings.
Though our constitutional provision on cumulative voting6" is,
with the exception of the word "managers" in the second clause,
identical to that of the state of Illinois,6 ' little of the reasoning
used by the Illinois Supreme Court in the Wolfson case62 was propounded in the Syphers case. Both decisions apparently arrive at
the same basic conclusion: that classified directorates do vitiate
the right of cumulative voting and are invalid, if, by its decision,
the West Virginia Supreme Court meant to apply its ruling to all
cases involving both cumulative voting and classified directorates.
If cumulative voting is to provide proportional representation,
rather than just some representation to the minority shareholders,
its effect is inconsistent with that of classified directorates. Cumulative voting, when provided for and when used by the minority stockholders, results in proportional representation on the board of directors. If classified directorates are also permitted, the minority
will not gain proportional representation, but normally will, if more
than one director is to be elected, gain some representation on the
board. It is apparent from scrutinizing the constitutional provisions
adopted on the subject of cumulative voting that none expressly
sets forth whether proportional representation is to be afforded
the minority or whether the constitutional mandate merely calls for
some representation for this group. Until precise language defining
this problem is placed in the constitutions of those states providing
for cumulative voting, hopeless conflict will result. Until that time
when it is expressly mandatorily provided that proportional representation is to be given the minority, it seems that classification
should be permitted to coexist with cumulative voting. For when
both are permitted, the minority still is afforded some representation
on the board of directors and does enjoy its right to be represented
through the means of voting cumulatively.
Aaron David Trub
60 W. VA. CoNsT. arL XI,
61 ILL. CONST. art. MI, §

62

§ 4.
3.

Wolfson v. Avery, 6 II. 2d 678, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955).
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